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This paper examines the structure of debt covenants in small firms, with emphasis on 
privately owned firms. It is based on a survey of a large sample of firms drawn from the S&P 
Register of Corporations. The findings show that debt covenants imposed on small firms differ 
according to the firm type (privately owned or publicly owned), debt level, the borrowing cost, 
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and the source of financing (bank or other sources). The evidence is generally consistent with 
the arguments relating to stockholder-bondholder agency cost conflicts and the Costly 
Contracting Hypothesis of Smith and Warner (1979). 
 
I. Introduction 
 Debt covenants are widely used in corporate debt issues, primarily as a means to 
safeguard the interests of lenders. They form a foundation for the monitoring and control 
relationship between creditors and borrowers. Properly structured debt covenants can mitigate 
agency problems between stockholders and bondholders, and thus lower the firm‟s borrowing 
costs. However, as Smith (1993) points out, covenants that are too restrictive can severely limit 
the operating and financial activities of the borrowing firm. In their seminal paper, Smith and 
Warner (1979) have provided a comprehensive analysis of the role of debt covenants in the 
context of agency costs between stockholders and bondholders. They identify four major 
sources of bondholder-stockholder conflicts – dividend payment, claim dilution, asset 
substitution, and under-investment – and explain how debt covenants can be structured to 
mitigate each of these potential problems. The first problem relates to excessive dividend 
payments which can erode the firm‟s cash flows to the detriment of bondholders. In the 
extreme case, as suggested by Black (1976), a company can easily escape the debt burden by 
paying out all of its assets as a dividend thereby leaving creditors with an empty shell. The 
second problem, claim dilution, would result from the issuance of additional debt that can 
potentially dilute the claims of prior bondholders. The third problem, asset substitution, relates 
to the possibility of the firm behavior in which riskier projects are undertaken subsequent to the 
issuance of debt thereby reducing the value of existing debt claims on the firm. The fourth 
problem, under-investment, can occur if the firm chooses not to undertake investment projects 
with positive net present value if the benefit by doing so accrues to the firm‟s bondholders. 
 The Costly Contracting Hypothesis by Smith and Warner (1979) proposes that control 
of bondholder-stockholder conflicts through financial contracts can increase the value of the 
firm. It also argues that even though debt covenants are costly, the net benefit realized would 
enable the firm value (and stockholder wealth) to be greater than without them. According to 
Smith and Warner, bond covenants that are intended to lower the stockholder-bondholder 
agency conflicts fall into these major categories: restrictions on dividend payments, restrictions 
on the firm‟s production and investment policy, restrictions on subsequent financial policy, 
covenants modifying the pattern of payoffs to bondholders, and covenants specifying bonding 
activities by the firm. There have been several studies examining the debt covenants in relation 
to agency costs in large, publicly owned corporations. Very little research has been done in 
examining the use of debt covenants in loan contracts of small firms. This study makes an 
attempt to fill the void.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a review of literature 
on debt covenants and motivation for the study. Section III describes the data and methodology. 
Section IV presents empirical evidence. Finally, Section V provides concluding remarks. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 A formal treatment of the role of debt covenants in the context of agency problems 
between stockholders and bondholders was presented in the seminal work of Smith and Warner 
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(1979) and their work formed a foundation for subsequent empirical research in the area. 
Fama (1990) analyzes the lenders‟ incentives to monitor their borrowers and hypothesized that 
debt seniority, covenants, and maturity structure are set to maximize the monitoring incentives 
of the senior lender.  Chen et al. (1995) analyze a situation in which banks make „bridge‟ loans 
that are junior to publicly-issued long-term debt. According to their analysis, the bank imposes 
safety covenants to protect its junior claims and also maintains a close surveillance of the 
firm‟s activity. The senior bondholders benefit from the higher safety standards imposed by the 
bank and also from the bank‟s monitoring. Further, if the bank sets too high a safety standard, 
the firm‟s equity value may decline. As a result, the firm may choose to finance its capital 
needs through the long-term debt market thereby increasing its maturity structure. Park (2000) 
explores this issue further and addresses the questions as to why banks make short-term loans, 
why their claims are senior to other claims, and why banks impose the most restrictive 
covenants on borrowing firms. His analysis shows that junior lenders do not monitor and senior 
debt is best held by financial intermediaries with the lowest monitoring costs. In order to 
maximize the monitoring incentives of the senior lender, the senior claim will have the most 
restrictive covenants and the shortest possible maturity. 
 Day and Taylor (1998) argue that debt covenants play a wider role in corporate 
governance for controlling relationships between lenders and firms and discuss the need for 
standardization of debt contracts. Any violation of debt covenants results in a technical default 
and, according to the findings in Beneish and Press (1995) and Fargher, Wilkins, and Holder-
Webb (2001), such violations are associated with increases in the firm‟s risk (systematic and 
unsystematic) and a decline in stock prices.  According to research by Mohrman (1989), 
Beneish and Press (1993), and Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995) debt covenants that are most 
commonly imposed on the borrowing firm relate to its profitability, liquidity, and leverage, and 
violating them happens to be associated with the most technical defaults. Using Dealscan 
database from Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC), Dichev and Skinner (2002) find that the three 
most frequently imposed debt covenants are the ratios of debt to cash flow, interest coverage, 
and fixed charge coverage. From a survey of senior bankers, Cotter (1998) finds that the most 
commonly used covenants in Australia are leverage, interest coverage, current ratio, and prior 
charges ratio. Day and Taylor (1997) interviewed bank loan officers in UK and found that 
majority of them saw debt covenants as a means to provide early warning signals of potential 
problems at the borrower firms and, in the event of deteriorating financial conditions, 
covenants turn out to be powerful levers to renegotiate the terms with the borrowers. They also 
found that dividend restrictions are rarely stipulated in bank loan covenants in UK, probably to 
avoid being a “shadow director” of the companies to which they lend. This evidence contrasts 
the finding of Healy and Palepu (1990) for US firms which commonly encounter dividend 
restrictions in their debt contracts.  
 Studies by Iskandar-Datta and Emery (1994) have found a trade-off between restrictive 
covenants and interest costs of debt. Their findings also showed an association between 
indenture provisions and credit ratings indicating that rating agencies may use the information 
in indentures in their evaluation process. An analysis of L.A. Gear‟s case by DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Wruck (2002) suggests that debt covenants can be a stronger disciplinary 
mechanism than the contractual requirement of making periodic interest payments on debt. The 
L.A. Gear case also shows that short-term debt enables frequent oversight and renegotiation of 
Use of Debt Covenants in Small Firms   (Bathala, Bowlin & Dukes) 
 
 
52 
credit agreements by lenders thereby limiting the ability of mangers to use liquid assets for 
circumventing the disciplinary pressures of debt. According to a study by Berger and Udell 
(1990), provisions relating to collateral requirements are associated with higher credit risk to 
lenders, i.e., the loan contracts of riskier borrowers had collateral provisions.  
 Ramsay and Sidhu (1998) examine private debt (bank) agreements of a small sample of 
16 contracts. They find prevalence of „tailored‟ accounting based constraints as well as non-
accounting based restrictions on firms‟ production and investment policies. Debt covenants also 
included financing, bonding, and reporting activities of the borrowing firms. The analysis 
presented in Pashley, Krishnaswamy, and Gilbert (1997) shows that debt covenants restricting 
the sale of depreciable assets may be positively associated with the amount of debt used by the 
firm and, as a result, the firm‟s compliance costs would be higher. Begley and Feltham (1999) 
examined the relationship between debt covenants (restrictions on dividends and additional 
borrowing) and management incentives. They hypothesized that a large cash compensation to 
CEO aligns CEO‟s interests with debt holders and large equity holdings align CEO‟s interests 
with equity holders. Using a sample of 91 senior debt issues by industrial firms, they find that 
covenants have a significant negative relation to CEO cash compensation and an insignificant 
relation to the CEO‟s equity holdings. 
 With respect to debt covenants relating to restrictions on dividend payments, John and 
Kalay (1982) show that debt covenants minimizing deividend payments are necessary to 
prevent potential wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders.  However, Kalay (1982) 
notes that the actual dividend payment levels are below the maximum levels allowed by the 
constraints which suggests that dividend related covenants may be superfluous. Consistent with 
this notion, Frankfuter and Wood (2002) argue, “although substantial in preceipitation of 
agency costs, its (sic) dividend policy is not a major source of bondholder wealth 
expropriation.” 
 While the above studies addressed various issues relating to debt covenants, none of 
them have examined issues relating to debt covenants in small firms, especially privately-
owned businesses. Our study fills the gap and sheds light on various aspects of debt covenants 
in small firms, and the motivation for the study stems from the fact that large-public firms and 
small-private firms differ structurally in several ways. First, in small firms the control of the 
firm‟s primarily rests in the hands of major owners who also happen to be the top managers. 
Outside equity owners, if any, tend to hold minority stakes and possess little control over the 
managerial behavior. Additionally, illiquidity of stock ownership, small number of investors, 
and information limitations tend to be more severe in private firms. Lack of discipline from 
stock market and takeover mechanism further exacerbate the agency problems in small firms. 
The boards of small firms are typically dominated by managers themselves, major stockholders 
and their family members and are susceptible to a lack of discipline or monitoring from 
outsiders. In contrast to the empirical evidence on large firms, for example Bathala and Rao 
(1995) who have found that outside directors on the board play an important role in mitigating 
agency conflicts between management and shareholders, Mace (1948) observes that board 
members of small firms do not play a major role in the formulation of higher level strategies or 
monitoring of top management.  
 In regard to information availability, public firms are required to file extensive 
information and periodic statements to the SEC and security exchanges which is not the case 
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with private firms. Often, the small firms‟ financial statements are not even audited and they 
need not prepare quarterly statements. Analyst following and institutional investors serve as 
information gatherers as well as monitors of managerial behavior. These mechanisms are not 
available for private firms. 
 With respect of debt finance, large-public firms tend to rely more heavily on publicly 
issued debt and the trustee for the bond issue, bond rating agencies, and investor trading 
activities provide the much needed monitoring functions. In case of small-private firms, the 
debt capital is primarily from bank finance, loans from family and friends, and accounts 
payable. Therefore, the monitoring is primarily by lenders themselves and credit bureaus for 
credit ratings. The potential default risk also varies between publicly-owned and privately-
owned firms because publicly-owned firms tend to have larger management teams, professional 
managers, larger asset base, and a greater potential to tide over the ups and downs of economic 
fortunes. 
 Owing to these major differences between public and private firms, we expect a great 
deal of divergence in debt covenants between the two groups. For example, there need not be a 
debt covenant for furnishing audited financial statements if it were a publicly-owned firm but it 
could be important for a privately-owned firm. Seeking guarantees from owner-managers and 
collateral for loans may be prominent among the debt covenants of private firms compared to 
public firms. Specifically, our research will provide answers to the following questions: (1) 
Which debt covenants are widely used in small firms? (2) Are there any differences in debt 
covenants in privately-owned and publicly-owned firms? (3) What are the major influencing 
factors of debt covenants in privately-owned firms? and (4) Can issues relating to agency costs 
and information asymmetry explain the differences in debt covenants among small firms? 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
 The data for this research were gathered using a survey instrument. The Standard & 
Poor‟s 1997 Directory of Corporations (Vol.1) is the source of names and addresses of the 
corporations surveyed in this research. The S&P Directory includes corporations (public and 
private), non-profit firms, charitable institutions, and trusts. From each page of the S&P 
Directory we chose the first firm in the first column. Next, we removed from the list all types of 
entities other than private and public corporations from the list (charities, universities, non-
profit hospitals, etc.). This procedure resulted in a sample of 2,870 companies – 2,251 private 
firms (78.4 percent) and 619 public firms (21.6 percent). The survey was anonymous and the 
questionnaire was not marked in order to ensure anonymity of responding firms. The survey 
instrument was four pages long and it sought information on ownership/governance issues, 
shareholder agreements, sale/transfer of ownership, and financial policies. 
 The survey questionnaires were mailed in the month of August, 1998. A total of 275 
firms provided responses for a response rate of 9.6%. An additional 75 envelopes were returned 
to us as undeliverable. Of the responses received 251 were usable. The response rate, although 
somewhat low, looks typical of surveys involving small firms. The President or CEO of the 
company provided as much as 74.5% of the responses, but the proportion of responses provided 
by them is higher for publicly owned firms (78%) than for privately owned firms (61%).  
However, from the comparisons presented below, we note that the responding firms are 
representative of the firms in the population. Further, the final sample size is large enough for 
Use of Debt Covenants in Small Firms   (Bathala, Bowlin & Dukes) 
 
 
54 
the purpose of the statistical methods (parametric and non-parametric) employed in the paper 
and making inferences about the data. 
 Out of the total of 251 responses, 201 (80.1%) are from privately-owned companies and 
50 (19.9%) are from publicly-owned companies. This distribution is very close to the 
distribution of firms in the mailing list (2,870 companies) --- 2,251 private firms (78.4%) and 
619 public firms (21.6%). The distribution of sample firms according to their business 
background is as follows: 130 firms (52%) are in manufacturing sector; 26 firms (10.4%) are in 
trading sector (wholesale and retail); 25 firms (10%) in agriculture, construction and mining, 
and 19 firms (7.6%) in service sector. The distribution of sample firms according to sales are as 
follows: 153 firms (61.7%) have sales revenues of $25 million or less. Of this, 139 are private 
firms (90.8%) and 14 (9.2%) are public firms. We find 17 firms (6.8%) with sales over $500 
million, of which 3 are private firms (17.6%) and 14 (82.4%) are public. The major difference 
between the distributions of private and public firms is that a greater proportion of public firms 
are larger in size than private firms. In terms of company size measured as the number of 
employees, a total of 138 firms (55%) have 100 or fewer employees. However, 125 of those 
firms are private (90.6%) whereas only 13 firms (9.4%) are public. At the other extreme, in the 
category of firms with employees of 500 or more, there are a total of 41 firms (16.3% of total 
respondents) of which 13 firms (31.7%) are private and 28 firms (68.3%) are public. Overall, 
sales and number of employees seem to correlate highly. 
 The data gathered from our survey are in different forms: (a) use of a Lichert scale (for 
example, 1 = Least important; ---- 5 = Most important), (b) by a range of values (for example, 1 
= Zero% debt ratio; ----- 6 = Debt ratio over 75%), (c) identification by a classification scheme 
(for example, 1 = Short-term debt; 2 = Medium-term debt, and 3 = Long-term debt), and (d) 
continuous measurement (for example, the CEO‟s length of experience at the firm). The 
classifications or rankings were appropriately used to capture the differences according to the 
needs of statistical approaches used in the study. The survey instrument was comprehensive 
and the questionnaire covered various topic areas, ownership and governance, CEO 
characteristics, financial policies (debt, dividends, and lease financing), and incentive/control 
mechanisms in firms. In this paper, we use survey responses that are relevant for examining the 
issues relating to debt covenants.  
 In the section about debt financing, we sought information about debt covenants. 
Specifically, the sample firms were asked to indicate the loan requirements and restrictive 
covenants relating to bank loans and loans from other sources. The loan 
requirements/covenants included in the questionnaire were intended to analyze the structure of 
debt covenants in small firms from the agency costs perspective of Smith and Warner (1979) 
and the questions sought information relating to both positive and negative covenants. The 
positive covenants are: (1) reporting covenants (furnishing financial statements and statements 
of accounts receivable and inventory), (2) bonding covenants (personal guarantees, requirement 
of life insurance policies of key personnel, and collateral requirements), and (3) ownership and 
control covenants (seeking stock ownership or representation on the company‟s board). The 
negative or restrictive covenants pertain to (1) restrictions on dividend payments (maximum 
payout ratio), (2) restrictions on salary/other compensation to officers and directors (to contain 
potential wealth expropriation by managers), (3) restrictions relating to maximum debt ratio 
and minimum liquidity (to control financial risk), and (4) restrictions on types on investments 
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or capital expenditures (to control the risk shifting behavior). A priori, we form the following 
hypotheses: 
 
 
H-1: Bank loans entail more covenants than loans from other sources. 
H-2:  Privately-owned and publicly-owned firms differ in the debt covenants imposed on 
them. 
H-3:  Within the privately-owned firms, debt covenants differ by (a) ownership and (b) firm 
size differences. 
H-4: Within the privately-owned firms, debt covenants would be positively related to (a) debt 
leverage, (b) debt cost, and (c) debt collateral.  
 
 
 Our first hypothesis (H-1) follows Chen, et al. (1995) and Park (2000) who showed that 
banks tend to be the active monitors of loans and they tend to be more stringent in imposing 
covenants to safeguard their claims against the firm. Our other hypotheses (H-2, H-3, and H-4)) 
are based on the potential differences in informational asymmetry and agency problems 
between firms that differ in ownership structure and firm size. The hypothesis H-2 is based on 
several differences between publicly-owned and privately-owned firms with respect to agency 
problems, informational asymmetry, and potential bankruptcy costs that were enumerated in 
the prior section of the paper.  
 Hypotheses H-3 and H-4 are examined for the debt covenant differences within the 
privately-owned group. H-3 proposes that debt covenants differ by differences in (a) ownership 
and (b) firm size. We argue that family owned firms, compared to closely/widely owned firms 
are likely to be subject to more debt covenants for such reasons as greater credit risks and 
information limitations. For similar reasons, smaller firms are likely to be subject to more debt 
covenants. H-4 proposes that debt covenants would be positively associated with (a) debt 
leverage, (b) cost of debt, and (c) debt collateral. The hypothesis H-4a is intuitive in that the 
greater the debt leverage the higher the potential bankruptcy risk and thus more debt covenants. 
Hypotheses H-4b and H-4c, on the other hand, assume that lenders assuming higher risks 
would not only require higher rates of return on their loans but also attach more debt covenants. 
Thus, the cost of debt and debt covenants would be positively related. In a similar vein, one can 
argue that that if lenders assume greater risks they are more likely to require collateral and also 
impose more debt covenants on those loans.  
 For empirical analysis, we use Chi-Squared tests and a multiple regression model. The 
Chi-Squared tests, in univariate setting, enable us to test the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference between the set of observed cell frequencies and the set of expected cell frequencies 
in a two-way classification scheme. Our emphasis is on privately-owned firms and therefore, 
we decompose the analyses further according to ownership differences (family-owned vs. 
closely- or widely-owned), firm size, and the use of debt leverage. The number of survey 
responses and the cell sizes are sufficiently large to make such comparisons among private 
firms using the Chi-Squared approach. Further, more general comparisons with publicly-owned 
firms are made using the data from the same survey. In our second approach, multiple 
regression analysis, we examine cross-sectional variations in debt covenants by estimating a 
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regression equation with a scaled measure of debt covenants as the dependent variable and a set 
of explanatory variables reflecting dimensions such as debt structure, inside ownership, CEO 
experience, dividend payout, age of the company, and the firm type (private or public).  
 While the two empirical approaches employed in the paper are appropriate for the data 
at hand and the inferences we intend to make, two potential need to be pointed out up-front. 
First, in Chi_Squared analysis, some frequency tables have expected cell sizes smaller than five 
but such instances were just a few. Second, in multiple regression analysis, many variables are 
discrete (for example, responses received on a Lichert scale or using a classification scheme to 
distinguish the variable of interest by multiple levels). But, from the degree of variation 
afforded by the classification scheme that we have used, the large number of observations for 
the regression, and the model‟s explanatory power, we are confident about the results. 
 
IV. Empirical Evidence 
  As debt covenants do not apply to those firms which do not use borrowed funds in their 
capital, we exclude such firms from our analysis of debt covenants. This resulted in a sample of 
147 private firms and 39 public firms which employed debt in their capital structure. In this we 
discuss our findings from the Chi-Squared method and a multiple regression model. In Chi-
Square analysis, we examine the differences in debt covenants and loan requirements according 
to loan type, ownership structure, firm size, debt features, and other firm characteristics. The 
univariate analysis with Chi-Squared tests enables us to identify the characteristics of firms that 
differentiate them with respect to the various debt covenants. However, they did not allow us to 
examine the partial effects of the various influencing factors of debt covenants while 
controlling for other variables. A multiple regression analysis is a useful technique to overcome 
this limitation as it enables us to regress the dependent variable on a set of explanatory 
variables. Using a multiple regression model, we would examine the relationship between the 
number of debt covenants on a firm and a set of debt related agency and bankruptcy costs, asset 
substitution, underinvestment, and risk shifting. Our expectation is that the firms with higher 
agency and bankruptcy costs will have a larger number of debt covenants. 
 
Univariate Analysis 
 In univariate analysis we examine the frequency distribution of various debt covenants 
by different firm characteristics: (A) Bank loans versus other loans, (B) Ownership and firm 
size differences, and (C) Differences in debt features. For statistical testing, we use the Chi-
Square approach and verify the null hypothesis that the expected and observed cell sizes are not 
significantly different from each other.  
 
 a. Bank Loans versus Other Loans 
 In Table I we examine the differences in covenants between bank loans and loans from 
other loans for privately-owned firms and publicly-owned firms. First, we examine debt 
covenants imposed in bank loans to firms. The three most widely used covenants in bank loans 
to privately-owned firms relate to (1) furnishing financial statements (95.2% of firms), (2) 
collateral of property and equipment (62.6% of firms), and (3) personal guarantees from major 
stockholders, officers, or directors (53.1% of firms). In case of publicly-owned companies, the 
three most widely used covenants in bank loans are (1) furnishing financial statements (87.2% 
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of firms), (2) restrictions on maximum debt level (41.0% of firms), and (3) requiring minimum 
level of liquidity (41.0% of firms).  
 According to the Chi-Squared test statistics, private and public firms differ from each 
other (at a 10% level of statistical significance or better) with respect to debt covenants relating 
to furnishing of financial statements (p-value = 0.069), personal guarantees from major 
stockholders, officers, or directors (p-value < 0.0001), collateral of property and equipment (p-
value = 0.0004), restrictions on maximum dividend payments (p-value = 0.004), restrictions on 
maximum debt level (p-value = 0.019), and requirement of minimum liquidity (p-value = 
0.094). In the case of private firms, banks‟ covenants geared more toward reporting and 
bonding requirements seem to be driven by informational asymmetry and security 
considerations. Compared to this, banks seem to be more concerned about excessive dividend 
payments and financial risk considerations in imposing covenants on loans to publicly-owned 
firms.  
 Next, we compare debt covenants between bank loans and loans from other sources.  In 
general, firms are subject to far fewer debt covenants when they borrow from sources other 
than banks. This finding is consistent with our a priori expectations and with the analysis in 
Chen, et al. (1995) and Park (2000). For private firms the three most widely used covenants in 
loans from other sources are the same as in the case of bank loans. In case of public firms, the 
three most popular debt covenants in loans from other sources are furnishing of financial 
statements, collateral of property and equipment, and restrictions on dividend payments.  
 In view of the small number of publicly-owned firms (n=39), it would be difficult to 
make any further rigorous analysis of debt covenants in those firms. Therefore, we concentrate 
on privately-owned firms for a more detailed analysis debt covenants. Lenders other than banks 
are not a homogeneous group and, as noted in Table I, loans from those sources do not contain 
many debt covenants. For these reasons, our further analysis will focus on debt covenants in 
bank loans to privately-owned firms. 
 
 b.  Ownership and Firm Size Differences 
    In Table II we examine the differences in frequency distributions of covenants in bank 
loans to private firms. The analysis is conducted by separating the firms according to 
ownership structure (family owned, n = 98; closely or widely owned, n = 50) and firm size 
(sales <= $25 million, n = 103; sales > $25 million, n = 45). For the most part, ownership or 
firm size differences do not seem to matter in the imposition of loan covenants by banks. The 
statistically significant differences as noted on the basis of Chi-Squared statistics relate only to 
the firm size differences with respect to the following two covenants. As high as 60.2% of 
smaller private firms (sales <= $25 m) are subject to covenants requiring personal guarantees 
from major stockholders, officers, or directors as opposed to only 35.6% of larger private firms 
(sales > $25 m). The Chi-Squared statistic of 7.627 is statistically significant with a p-value of 
0.006. About 40% of larger private firms (sales > $25 m) reported have covenants relating to 
minimum level of liquidity compared to 21.4% of smaller private firms (sales <= $25 m) 
having such covenants. The Chi-Squared statistic of 5.513 is statistically significant with a p-
value of 0.019. 
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 c.  Differences by Debt Features  
 We now turn our attention to three different debt characteristics (debt level, borrowing, 
and collateral for debt) which are likely to have a strong bearing on debt covenants. A firm‟s 
financial risk and its potential for bankruptcy would increase as the firm increases its debt 
leverage. As a consequence, lenders are likely to impose more debt covenants on firms with 
higher debt use. Therefore, we expect debt covenants to be a positive function of debt leverage 
used by firms. Bank lending to firms are typically linked to the prime rate and the lending rate 
would primarily depend upon the bank‟s risk exposure in the loan. In addition to increasing the 
lending rate to high risk borrowers, banks are likely to impose more debt covenants on them. If 
this assumption holds, we can expect a positive association between the firm‟s borrowing cost 
and debt covenants. If a bank loan is secured (for example, by accounts receivable or 
inventory), then the bank‟s risk exposure diminishes relative to lending on unsecured basis. If 
so, firms with majority of bank loans in the secured form are likely to be subject to fewer debt 
covenants. Alternatively, if banks require security on the assumption of higher risks associated 
with the loan, then they may impose more covenants in addition to lending on secured basis. If 
this assumption holds, we would see a positive association between secured loans and debt 
covenants.  
 First, we examine the relationship between debt leverage and debt covenants. 
Specifically, we examine this relationship by dividing the responding firms into three groups 
according to their debt levels (Low debt firms: 1-10% debt ratio, n = 42; Medium debt firms: 
11-25% debt ratio, n = 41; and High debt firms: >25% debt ratio, n = 59). As discussed 
previously, we anticipate an increase in the proportion of firms subject to a given covenant as 
the debt ratio increases from low to high.  
 The frequency distributions of firms in different debt levels and the covenants to which 
they are subject are presented in Table III. The Chi-Squared tests are conducted to verify if 
there are significant differences between the expected and observed cell counts. From the data 
in Table III, we can first notice that the proportion of firms that are subject to any given 
covenant increases with the level of debt providing a general confirmation to our hypothesis, 
H-4. The statistically significant differences, however, relate to covenants involving bonding 
and collateral requirements, maximum debt levels, minimum liquidity levels, and the type of 
investments. The Chi-Squared statistics and p-values relating to the expected versus observed 
frequency distributions of those covenants have statistical significance at the 5% level or better. 
This evidence clearly points out that banks are concerned with the increasing potential for risks 
of bankruptcy and asset substitution as the firms they lend to become increasingly levered. 
 Second, we examine the relationship between the cost of bank loans and bank loan 
covenants in private firms. For this purpose, we classify borrowing costs into two categories – 
borrowing at or below the prime rate (n = 85) and borrowing above the prime rate (n = 64). The 
data and the Chi-Squared test statistics are presented in Table IV. As can be seen, in every debt 
covenant the proportion of firms whose borrowing cost is above the prime rate is larger than the 
proportion of firms whose borrowing cost is below the prime rate and the difference is 
statistically significant for 7 out of 12 covenants. This evidence supports our contention of a 
positive linkage between the loan covenants and the borrowing cost, a relationship that is 
implied in Smith and Warner‟s Costly Contracting Hypothesis. 
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 Third, we examine the relationship between debt security and debt covenants. In the 
survey questionnaire, we asked firms to indicate if the majority of debt used by them is 
unsecured or secured. Table IV contains the frequency distributions of debt covenants in firms 
that differ in debt security: majority of debt being on secured or unsecured basis. As can be 
seen, in every debt covenant a larger percentage of firms in the secured debt category are 
subject to the covenant in question relative to the firms in the unsecured debt category. The 
Chi-Squared tests suggest that the two groups differ in the imposition of loan covenants upon 
them, with the exception of the covenants relating to furnishing of financial statements, life 
insurance of key personnel, and limits on executive salary/compensation. This evidence seems 
to support the contention that banks not only require security for their loans when their lending 
risks are high but also impose more covenants on such firms. Conversely, low risk firms seem 
to receive bank loans on an unsecured basis and are subject to fewer covenants at the same 
time. 
 
Regression Analysis 
 The univariate analyses and Chi-Square tests in the previous section have provided 
insights into the differences in debt covenants by different firm characteristics. Since univariate 
approaches do not allow us to control for other influencing factors, we conduct multivariate 
analysis by employing a multiple regression model with a measure of debt covenants as the 
dependent variable. Through regression analysis we can examine the cross-sectional variations 
in debt covenants using multiple dimensions of explanatory variables reflecting ownership 
differences, debt characteristics, dividend payout, company size, age, and the firm‟s class 
(private or public). 
 
 a. Description of the Regression Model  
 The dependent variable in our regression model is BANKCOV, the sum of different 
bank covenants imposed on the firm. We assume that the total number of different covenants 
imposed on a firm is a function of various influencing factors such as debt related agency and 
bankruptcy costs, asset substitution, underinvestment, and risk shifting that are enumerated in 
Smith and Warner (1979). Specifically, we use the sum of the affirmative responses to survey 
questions relating to the existence or otherwise of the following covenants: (1) Furnishing 
financial statements, (2) Periodic statements of accounts receivable and inventory, (3) Personal 
guarantees from major stockholders, officers, or directors of the firm, (4) Collateral of property 
and/or equipment, (5) Life insurance covering the key personnel or major stockholders of the 
firm, (6) Requiring representation on the company‟s board of directors,(7) Seeking equity 
ownership in the firm, (8) Maximum dividend payout ratio, (9) Maximum salary/other 
compensation to the company‟s officers and directors, (10) Maximum debt level, (11) 
Minimum level of liquidity, and (12) Types of investments or capital expenditures that the 
company can make. As in the univariate analysis, we have excluded firms that responded 
indicating no debt financing in their capital. The explanatory variables are those that are 
conceptually and empirically important from the standpoint of debt covenants imposed on the 
firm. We specify the following multiple regression equation. The measurement of variables is 
described in Table V. 
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BANKCOV = f (DEBTRAT  DEBTMAT  DEBTCOLL  DEBTCOST  TRCREDIT 
                            INSOWN  CEOEXP  PAYOUT  COMPAGE  SIZE  FIRMTYPE) 
 
 Our first explanatory variable in the regression is DEBTRAT, the debt ratio with 
numerical values ranging from 2 to 6. The value of 2 is assigned to the responses that checked 
the debt ratio in the range of 1-10% and the value of 6 is assigned to the responses indicating 
the debt ratio over 75%. The numerical value of 1 is excluded as it was assigned for responses 
indicating no debt usage. We expect a positive relationship between DEBTRAT and 
BANKCOV. The DEBTMAT variable indicates the maturity structure of majority of the firm‟s 
debt. The maturity differences are captured by numerical values, 1 = short-term, 2 = medium-
term, and 3 = long-term. Typically, long-term debt is riskier from lender‟s standpoint and they 
may impose more covenants for assuming higher risks in lending for long term. On the other 
hand, banks typically lend for short term and they tend to impose more covenants on borrowers 
than other lenders. As a result, it is hard to make an a priori determination of the sign for the 
parameter estimate of DEBTMAT.  SECDEBT indicates if majority of the firm‟s debt is 
unsecured (value = 1) or secured (value = 1). As discussed previously, secured debt may be 
associated with fewer or more debt covenants. As such, the sign for the coefficient of 
SECDEBT is indeterminate. 
 The borrowing cost of debt, DEBTCOST, is measured on a numerical scale of 1 to 5 (1 
= borrowing cost below the prime rate.....5 = borrowing cost more than 5% over the prime 
rate). The larger the number the higher the borrowing cost. As riskier firms tend to have higher 
borrowing costs, it would be reasonable to assume that such firms are also subject to more debt 
covenants. Therefore, we hypothesize positive coefficient for the DEBTCOST variable. Trade 
credit (TRCREDIT) is a major source of financing for small firms. This variable is measured 
on a Lichert scale with values ranging from 1 to 5 indicating the importance of trade credit as a 
source of financing (1 = least important……5 = most important). It is likely that banks may 
view firms with heavy reliance on trade credit as riskier because high trade credit balances may 
induce a potential dilution of the their own claims against the firm. In order to increase the 
safety of their loans banks may impose more debt covenants on such firms. Therefore, we 
expect a positive sign for the coefficient of TRCREDIT. 
 INSOWN and CEOEXP are intended to capture the managerial incentive effects that 
may impact the risk perception banks for lending as well as determination of debt covenants. 
INOWN is a measure of insider ownership of common stock, the percentage of firm‟s stock 
owned by its officers and directors. It is measured on a numerical scale with the value of 1 
indicating no insider ownership and the value of 5 for insider ownership greater than 75%. A 
high insider stock ownership may lead to increased agency costs between stockholders and 
bondholders especially those associated with underinvestment and risk shifting. As such, 
INSOWN is likely to have a positive association with BANKCOV. The CEOEXP is measured 
as the number of years of CEO‟s experience in that position with the firm. The CEOs with 
longer tenures indicate stability of leadership at the firm level and such CEOs are also likely to 
have long-standing relationships with lenders, especially banks. These positive aspects may 
reduce lending risks and banks may choose to impose fewer debt covenants of the firm. This 
possibility suggests a negative association between CEOEXP and BANKCOV. 
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 The potential for excessive dividend payments is a major source of agency conflicts 
between stockholders and bondholders. In order to prevent this potential agency problem, 
bondholders are likely to impose more debt covenants on the firm in addition to a restrictive 
covenant on dividend payments. If this argument holds, we would find a positive relationship 
between the firm‟s dividend payout ratio (PAYOUT) and its debt covenants (BANKCOV). 
This PAYOUT variable is measured on a numerical scale of 1 to 6….the value of 1 with 
responses for zero payout ratio and 6 with responses for payout ratio greater than 75%.  
 The next explanatory variable, COMPAGE, is the company‟s age measured as the 
number of years of its operation. A firm‟s longevity is indicative of its stability and its potential 
to weather the ups and downs in economic conditions. Firms in existence for longer time 
periods are also more likely to have long-term on-going relationships with their bankers. As a 
result, banks may view such firms to be less risky and impose fewer covenants on them. If this 
expectation holds, we may find a negative relationship between COMPAGE and BANKCOV. 
Firm size (SIZE) is measured as on a numerical scale using company sales: 1 = $50 m or less;     
2 = $51-100 m; 3 = $101 - $500 m; 4 = $500 m - $1 b; 5 = > 1 b. The last variable, 
FIRMTYPE, is a 0-1 dummy variable. It takes the value equals 1 if the firm is publicly-owned 
and 0 if the firm is privately-owned. Firms that are privately owned are prone to potentially 
greater problems of information asymmetry and bankruptcy risk than publicly owned firms. On 
the other hand, publicly owned firms are more far more likely to have stockholder-bondholder 
agency conflicts than privately owned firms. Given this dichotomy, it is difficult to make an 
unambiguous prediction for the sign of FIRMTYPE variable.  
 
 b. Discussion of Regression Results  
 The regression results are presented in Table V. In all, 148 firms had responses for all 
the variables in the regression equation. The estimated equation has an adjusted R-Square of 
0.2407, which is quite reasonable considering the cross-sectional nature of the study. The 
Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) of all explanatory variables are less than 2 which enable us to 
infer that there is no multicollinearity problem causing confounding of parameter estimates. 
 The coefficients for DEBTRAT, DEBTCOST, and TRCREDIT variables are 
statistically significant with positive signs as expected. These findings are supportive of our 
priors that the greater the risks to the lender the more the debt covenants.  
 The parameter estimate of the CEOEXP variable is also statistically significant but its 
positive sign is the opposite of our expectation of a negative sign. While this evidence is 
somewhat surprising, it is plausible that banks may be viewing the CEO‟s tenure with the firm 
as a factor for potential entrenchment problems as well as higher stockholder-debt holder 
related agency conflict. This is a conjecture that seems to explain the positive association 
between CEOEXP and BANKCOV. The only other variable that has a statistically significant 
relationship to BANKCOV is FIRMTYPE which has a positive coefficient. This evidence 
supports the argument that stockholder-debt holder conflicts are likely to be more in publicly 
owned firms and as a consequence they encounter more debt covenants than privately owned 
firms. We ran two regression models, without SIZE (Model 1) and with SIZE (Model 2) 
specifically to assess the partial effect of firm size on debt covenants. With the addition of 
SIZE the adjusted R-Square improved to 0.2691, but the parameter estimate for SIZE is not 
statistically significant. However, the variable for secured debt (SECDEBT) that had a positive 
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but statistically insignificant coefficient has now turned statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level. 
 Next, we modified the dependent variable such that its measurement includes only those 
covenants that are more directly linked to Smith and Warner‟s costly contracting arguments. 
We denote the new dependent variable as BANKCOV1, which is the sum of affirmative 
responses for the following six debt covenants: (3) Personal guarantees from major 
stockholders, officers, or directors of the firm, (4) Collateral of property and/or equipment, (8) 
Maximum dividend payout ratio, (10) Maximum debt level, (11) Minimum level of liquidity, 
and (12) Types of investments or capital expenditures that the company can make. The results 
from this regression model (Model 3) are presented in Table V. This model has an adjusted R-
Square of 0.2115 (versus 0.2691 for Model 2), indicating loss of some explanatory power 
owing to fewer number of covenants included in the measurement of the dependent variable. 
Further, the results are essentially the same except for slight changes in the statistical 
significance of some of the explanatory variables. 
 
 c. Loan Covenants and Cost of Debt: Further Analysis 
 Both univariate and regression analyses revealed evidence of a positive association 
between the cost of debt and loan covenants, a result that is consistent with Smith and Warner‟s 
Costly Contracting Hypothesis which implies that loan covenants should be priced in the 
market. However, one reviewer suggested that we can do a more direct test of the observed 
relationship between the two by regressing the cost of debt on various loan covenants and firm 
characteristics.  Following by the reviewer‟s suggestion, we regressed the cost of debt 
(DEBTCOST: 1 = Below Prime Rate; 2 = At Prime Rate; 3 = Up to 2% over Prime Rate; 
4 = Between 2.1 and 5% over Prime Rate; 5 = More than 5% over Prime Rate) on loan 
covenants variables (two separate regressions for BANKCOV and BANKCOV1) and firm 
characteristics as in the previous regressions. The findings show that the loan covenants 
variable, measured as either BANKCOV or BANKCOV1, is positively related to the cost of 
debt with the coefficient for BANKCOV significant at the one percent level and the coefficient 
for BANKCOV1 significant at the five percent level. In both regressions the SIZE variable has 
a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the one percent level. None of the other 
variables have coefficients that are statistically significant. Therefore, for the sake of brevity 
results from these regressions are not reported in a separate table. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 Our study of an examination of debt covenants in small firms is based on a survey of a 
large sample of firms drawn from the S&P Directory of Corporations. The responses received 
from the firms participating in the survey formed the data base for the empirical analysis in the 
study. For data analysis we have used Chi-Squared tests and a multiple regression analyis. 
 The study has provided interesting insights into the debt covenants in small firms and 
the findings are unique in many ways. First, no other study known to us has made a 
comprehensive examination of debt covenants in small firms, especially privately owned firms. 
Second, in addition to providing a comparison of debt covenants between privately-owned and 
publicly-owned firms, the study explains the differences in debt covenants in privately-owned 
firms on the basis of firm characteristics relating to ownership and debt leverage. 
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 The major findings from the study are as follows. First, debt covenants imposed on 
most small firms relate to bank loans than loans from other sources. Second, a larger proportion 
of private firms compared to public firms are subject to positive covenants or loan requirements 
that are of reporting and bonding nature (e.g., furnishing financial statements, offering 
guarantees, collateral, or life insurance policies to secure loans. A higher percentage of public 
firms, on the other hand, are subject to covenants primarily relating to excessive dividend 
payments, excessive use of debt, restrictions on the type of investments or capital expenditures; 
perhaps, to prevent asset substitution, and maintenance of minimum liquidity. The restrictive 
covenants relating to dividends could be because the average size of these public firms is 
larger, indicating they are more mature firms. More mature firms tend to pay higher dividends. 
Thus excessive dividend can become more of a problem. Less established smaller firms tend to 
be short of cash, hence having less incentive to pay dividend. Second, public firms are known 
to have shareholders. Third, among private firms, we do not find significant differences in most 
of the covenants imposed by banks on the basis of differences in ownership (family owned or 
closely/widely owned) or firm size. Fourth, among private firms, the proportion of firms 
subject to bank loan covenants increases with the debt level, the cost of borrowing, and if the 
debt is on secured basis. In general, the findings from regression analysis are consistent with 
the findings from the Chi-Squared tests, and it strengthens our findings by controlling for the 
various factors that have a bearing on debt covenants. Overall, the findings are consistent with 
the arguments relating to agency cost conflicts between stockholders and bondholders. More 
importantly, the sustained positive relationship between loan covenants and the cost of debt 
observed in both univariate and multiple regression analysis supports the implication of Smith 
and Warner‟s Costly Contracting Hypothesis that loan covenants should be priced in the 
market.  
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Table I 
Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private vs. Public Firms 
 
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the 
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized. 
Cell values are the Number  (Percentage) 
of firms within the respective class 
(Private or Public) indicating the 
existence of the covenant in question. 
Bank Loans Other Loans 
Private 
Firms 
(n=147) 
Public 
Firms 
(n=39) 
Chi-Sq. 
(p-val.) 
Private 
Firms 
(n=147) 
Public 
Firms 
(n=39) 
Chi-Sq. 
(p-val.) 
Loan Requirements (Positive Covenants) 
Furnishing financial statements: inc. 
statement, bal. sheet, and cash flows. 
140 
(95.2) 
34 
(87.2) 
3.316 
(0.069) 
18    
(12.2) 12   (30.8) 
7.819 
(0.005) 
Periodic statements of accounts 
receivable and inventory. 
58 
(39.5) 
13 
(33.3) 
0.489 
(0.484) 
8 
(5.5) 
2 
(5.1) 
0.007 
(0.931)@ 
Personal guarantees from major 
stockholders, officers, or directors. 
78 
(53.1) 
6 
(15.4) 
17.667 
(< .0001) 
12 
(8.1) 
0 
(0.0) 
3.403 
(0.065) 
Collateral of property and/or equipment. 92 
(62.6) 
12 
(30.8) 
12.657 
(0.0004) 16   (10.9) 
6 
(15.4) 
0.599 
(0.439) 
Life insurance covering the firm’s key 
personnel or major stockholders. 
31 
(21.1) 
5 
(12.8) 
1.350 
(0.245) 
8 
(5.5) 
1 
(2.6) 
0.565 
(0.452)@ 
Requiring representation on the 
company’s board of directors. 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
1 
(0.7) 
2 
(5.3) 
3.975 
(0.046)@ 
Seeking equity ownership in the firm. 
 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 2   (1.4) 2   (5.1) 
2.079 
(0.149) 
Loan Restrictions (Negative Covenants) 
Maximum dividend payments (e.g., max. 
payout ratio) to stockholders. 
20 
(13.6) 
13 
(33.3) 
8.220 
(0.004) 
2 
(1.4) 
6 
(15.4) 
14.728 
(0.0001)@ 
Max. salary/other compensation to the 
company’s officers & directors.. 
9 
(6.1) 
1 
(2.6) 
0.767 
(0.381)@ 
6 
(4.1) 
0 
(0.0) 
1.645 
(0.200)@ 
Max. debt level (e.g., maximum debt level 
as a percentage of total capital). 
33 
(22.4) 
16 
(41.0) 
5.482 
(0.019) 
6 
(4.1) 
5 
(12.8) 
4.230 
(0.040)@ 
Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min.  current 
ratio, coverage ratio, or working capital). 
40 
(27.2) 
16   
(41.0) 
2.795 
(0.094) 
4 
(2.7) 
5 
(12.8) 
6.828 
(0.009)@ 
Types of investments or capital 
expenditures the firm can make. 
22 
(15.0) 9   (23.1) 
1.460 
(0.227) 
5 
(3.4) 
2 
(5.1) 
0.254 
(0.614)@ 
Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 2 x 2 contingency tables, with two classes of firms (Private and Public) 
and two responses ( a check mark or no check mark) for the existence of respective covenant. For brevity, only the 
cell counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are furnished in the table. 
@ indicates that 25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5. 
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Table II 
Banks’ Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private Firms 
 
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the 
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized. 
Cell values are the Number  (Percentage) 
of firms within the respective class (By 
Ownership or By Firm Size) indicating 
the existence of the covenant in question. 
By Ownership By Firm Size 
Family 
Owned 
 
(n = 98) 
Closely/W
idely 
Owned 
(n = 50) 
Chi-Sq. 
(p-val.) 
Sales 
<= 
$25 m 
(n = 103) 
Sales 
> $25 m 
 
(n = 45) 
 
Chi-Sq. 
(p-val.) 
Loan Requirements (Positive Covenants) 
Furnishing financial statements: inc. 
statement, bal. sheet, and cash flows. 
93    
(94.9) 
49    
(98.0) 
0.819 
(0.366) 97    (94.1) 
44    
(97.8) 
0.902 
(0.342) 
Periodic statements of accounts 
receivable and inventory. 
36    
(36.7) 
22    
(44.0) 
0.733 
(0.392) 40    (38.8) 18  (40.0) 
0.018 
(0.894) 
Personal guarantees from major 
stockholders, officers, or directors. 
53    
(54.1) 
25    
(50.0) 
0.221 
(0.638) 62    (60.2) 
16    
(35.6) 
7.627 
(0.006) 
Collateral of property and/or equipment. 60    
(61.2) 
33    
(66.0) 
0.323 
(0.570) 68    (66.0) 
25    
(55.6) 
1.468 
(0.226) 
Life insurance covering the firm’s key 
personnel or major stockholders. 
23    
(23.5) 8    (16.0) 
1.116 
(0.291) 22    (21.4) 9    (20.0) 
0.035 
(0.852) 
Requiring representation on the 
company’s board of directors. 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
Seeking equity ownership in the firm. 
0    (0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
Loan Restrictions (Negative Covenants) 
Max. dividend payments (e.g., max. 
payout ratio) to stockholders. 
12    
(12.2) 8    (16.0) 
0.399 
(0.527) 
11 
(10.7) 
9 
(20.0) 
2.328 
(0.127) 
Max. salary/other compensation to the 
officers and directors.. 6    (6.1) 
3 
(6.0) 
0.009 
(0.977) 
6 
(5.8) 
3 
(6.7) 
0.039 
(0.844) 
Max. debt level (e.g., maximum debt level 
as a percentage of total capital). 
19    
(19.4) 
14    
(28.0) 
1.417 
(0.234) 22    (21.4) 
11    
(24.4) 
0.172 
(0.678) 
Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min. current 
ratio, coverage ratio, or working capital). 
24    
(24.5) 
16    
(32.0) 
0.947 
(0.330) 22    (21.4) 
18    
(40.0) 
5.513 
(0.019) 
Types of investments or capital 
expenditures the firm can make. 
16    
(16.3) 
6      
(12.0) 
0.490 
(0.484) 14    (13.5) 8     (17.8) 
0.434 
(0.510) 
Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 2 x 2 contingency tables, with two classes of firms in each case (By 
Ownership or By Firm Size) and two responses (a check or no check mark) for the existence of respective 
covenant. For brevity, only the cell counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are 
furnished in the table. @ indicates that 25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5. 
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Table III 
Banks’ Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private Firms 
 
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the 
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized. 
Cell values are the Number  (Percentage) of firms within 
the respective class (By Debt Leverage) indicating the 
existence of the covenant in question. 
By Debt Leverage 
Debt Ratio 
1 -10 % 
(n=42) 
Debt Ratio 
11 - 25 % 
(n=41) 
Debt Ratio 
> 25 % 
(n=59) 
Chi-Sq 
(p-value) 
Loan Requirements Cell values are the number (percentage) of firms. 
Furnishing financial statements: income statement, 
balance sheet, and cash flows. 
39 
(92.9) 
39 
(95.1) 
57 
(96.6) 
0.738 
(0.691) 
Periodic statements of accounts receivable and inventory. 12 
(28.6) 
17 
(41.5) 
28 
(47.5) 
3.684 
(0.159) 
Personal guarantees from the firm’s major stockholders, 
officers, or directors. 
16 
(38.1) 
20 
(48.8) 
37 
(62.7) 
6.111 
(0.047) 
Collateral of property and/or equipment. 
 
21 
(50.0) 
24 
(58.5) 
45 
(76.3) 
7.878 
(0.019) 
Life insurance covering the key personnel or major 
stockholders of the firm. 
4 
(9.5) 
10 
(24.4) 
15 
(25.4) 
4.378 
(0.112) 
Requiring representation on the company’s board of 
directors. 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N.A. 
Seeking equity ownership in the firm. 
 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N.A. 
Loan Restrictions / Covenants Cell values are the number (percentage) of firms. 
Maximum dividend payments (e.g., max. payout ratio) to 
common stockholders. 
4 
(9.5) 
4 
(9.8) 
11 
(18.6) 
2.414 
(0.299) 
Maximum salary/other compensation to the company’s 
officers and directors.. 
0 
(0.00) 
3 
(7.3) 
5 
(8.5) 
3.622 
(0.164) 
Maximum debt level (e.g., maximum debt level as a 
percentage of total capital). 
3 
(7.1) 
9 
(21.9) 
20 
(33.9) 
10.072 
(0.006) 
Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min. current ratio, coverage 
ratio, or working capital). 
5 
(11.9) 
10 
(24.4) 
24 
(40.7) 
10.469 
(0.005) 
Types of investments or capital expenditures that the 
company can make. 
2 
(4.8) 
4 
(9.8) 
15 
(25.4) 
9.470 
(0.009) 
Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 3 x 2 contingency tables, with three classes of firms (By Debt Leverage) 
and two responses (a check or no check mark) for the existence of respective covenant. For brevity, only the cell 
counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are furnished in the table. @ indicates that 
25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5. 
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Table IV 
Banks’ Loan Requirements and Restrictive Covenants – Private Firms 
 
Question: Banks and creditors typically require protection for their loans in several ways. Please indicate (with “X”) the 
conditions/restrictions relating to bank loans and loans from other sources that the firm has utilized. 
Cell values are the Number  (Percentage) 
of firms within the respective class (By 
Debt Cost or By Debt Security) indicating 
the existence of the covenant in question. 
By Debt Cost By Debt Security 
<= Prime 
Rate 
(n = 85) 
> Prime 
Rate 
(n = 64) 
 
Chi-Sq. 
(p-val.) 
Unsecured 
Debt 
(n = 45) 
Secured 
Debt 
(n = 94) 
 
Chi-Sq. 
(p-val.) 
Loan Requirements (Positive Covenants) 
Furnishing financial statements: inc. 
statement, bal. sheet, and cash flows. 79   (92.9) 63   (98.4) 
2.463 
(0.117) 
42 
(93.3) 
90 
(95.7) 
0.370 
(0.543) 
Periodic statements of accounts 
receivable and inventory. 30   (35.3) 28   (43.8) 
1.098 
(0.295) 
10 
(22.2) 
47 
(50.0) 
9.707 
(0.002) 
Personal guarantees from major 
stockholders, officers, or directors. 25   (29.4) 53   (82.8) 
41.738 
(<.0001) 
13 
(28.9) 
64 
(68.1) 
18.922 
(<.0001) 
Collateral of property and/or equipment. 
43   (50.6) 50   (78.1) 
11.802 
(0.0006) 
16 
(35.6) 
74 
(78.7) 
24.845 
(<.0001) 
Life insurance covering the firm’s key 
personnel or major stockholders. 13   (15.3) 
18    
(28.1) 
3.648 
(0.056) 
9 
(20.0) 
21 
(22.3) 
0.098 
(0.754) 
Requiring representation on the 
company’s board of directors. 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
Seeking equity ownership in the firm. 
0       (0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
0 
(0.0) 
0 
(0.0) N/A 
Loan Restrictions (Negative Covenants) 
Max. dividend payments (e.g., max. 
payout ratio) to stockholders. 7       (8.2) 13   (20.3) 
4.583 
(0.032) 
2 
(4.4) 
17 
(18.1) 
4.798 
(0.029) 
Max. salary/other compensation to the 
officers and directors.. 2       (2.4) 7     (10.9) 
4.741 
(0.030)@ 
2 
(4.4) 
7 
(7.4) 
0.453 
(0.501)@ 
Max. debt level (e.g., maximum debt level 
as a percentage of total capital). 14   (16.5) 19   (29.7) 
3.699 
(0.054) 
6 
(13.3) 
27 
(28.7) 
3.981 
(0.046) 
Min. level of liquidity (e.g., min. current 
ratio, coverage ratio, or working capital). 22   (25.9) 18   (28.1) 
0.094 
(0.760) 
8 
(17.8) 
32 
(34.0) 
3.928 
(0.048) 
Types of investments or capital 
expenditures the firm can make. 8       (9.4) 14   (21.9) 
4.506 
(0.034) 
3 
(6.7) 
19 
(20.2) 
4.192 
(0.041) 
Note: Chi-Square tests are based on the 2 x 2 contingency tables, with two classes of firms in each case (By Cost 
or By Debt Security) and two responses (a check or no check mark) for the existence of respective covenant. For 
brevity, only the cell counts (percentages) of firms responding with a check mark or “yes” are furnished in the 
table. @ indicates that 25 percent or more of expected counts have values less than 5. 
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Table V 
Regression Analysis : Cross-sectional Variation in Debt Covenants 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dep. Variable BANKCOV BANKCOV BANKCOV1 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
INTERCEPT -3.086 1.365** -4.084 1.482*** -3.463 1.163*** 
DEBTRAT 0.505 0.124*** 0.652 0.146*** 0.452 0.115*** 
DEBTMAT 0.128 0.205 0.126 0.215 0.139 0.168 
SECDEBT 0.532 0.348 0.643 0.370* 0.538 0.291* 
DEBTCOST 0.500 0.199** 0.568 0.220*** 0.328 0.173* 
TRCREDIT 0.218 0.105** 0.188 0.112* 0.147 0.088* 
INSOWN 0.153 0.103 0.151 0.109 0.087 0.086 
CEOEXP 0.314 0.159** 0.302 0.173* 0.233 0.136* 
PAYOUT -0.101 0.119 -0.093 0.131 -0.018 0.103 
COMPAGE 0.129 0.149 0.151 0.157 0.093 0.123 
SIZE --- --- 0.057 0.195 0.004 0.153 
FIRMTYPE 1.177 0.478** 1.117 0.557** 0.875 0.4377** 
Statistical Significance:    *** 1 percent;    ** 5 percent;      * 10 percent 
# of Observations 148 136 136 
Adj. R-Square 0.2407 0.2691 0.2115 
Var. Infl. Factors All < 2 All <= 2 All <= 2 
Variable Measurement  
DEBTRAT 2 = 1-10%;      3 = 11-25%;      4 = 26-50%;     5 = 51-75%;      6 = >75% 
DEBTMAT Debt Maturity: 1 = Short-term; 2 = Medium-term; 3 = Long-term. 
SECDEBT Whether majority of the firm’s debt is Unsecured (= 1) or Secured (= 2). 
DEBTCOST 1 = Below Prime Rate; 2 = At Prime Rate; 3 = Up to 2% over Prime Rate; 
4 = Between 2.1 and 5% over Prime Rate; 5 = More than 5% over Prime Rate. 
TRCREDIT Trade credit as a source of finance: 1 = Least important; ..... 5 = Most important. 
INSOWN 
Stock ownership by insiders: 1 = 0%;     2 = 1-10%;      3 = 11-25%;      4 = 26-50%;                       
5 = 51-75%;      6 = >75% 
CEOEXP CEO’s tenure (number of years) in that position. 
PAYOUT 
Dividend payout ratio: 1 = 0%;     2 = 1-10%;      3 = 11-25%;      4 = 26-50%;                                          
5 = 51-75%;      6 = >75% 
COMPAGE 
Age of the company – the number of years of operation: 1 = 1-5 yrs;   2 = 6-10 yrs;   3 = 
11-25 yrs;   4 = 26-50 yrs;   5 = 51-75 yrs;   6 = > 75 yrs. 
SIZE Company Sales: 1 = $50 m or less;     2 = $51-100 m;     3 = $101 - $500 m;             4 = 
$500 m - $1 b;     5 = > 1 b.                 
FIRMTYPE Dummy variable; 1 = If the company is publicly-owned; 0 otherwise. 
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